NND Project Number: NND 63316. By: NWD Date: 2011
TOP SECRET - Sensitive
problem in Southeast Asia and different assumptions as to how the United States Government should proceed to achieve its policy goals. During the early months of 1964, these are well illustrated in the different approaches taken to the problem of determining the extent and implications of the movement of men and supplies through Laos.
At the end of 1963 and early in 1964, there was general agreement among all Washington agencies that we lacked adequate information concerning the nature. and magnitude of whatever movement of men and materiel was occurring along the Laotien infiltration routes. For example, citing the "lack of clarity" on the "role of external intrusion" in South Vietnam, Walt Rostow urged William Sullivan on the eve of his March visit to attempt to "come back from Saigon with as lucid and agreed a picture" as possible on the extent of the infiltration and its influence on the Viet Cong. [41] A few days later, the Defense Intelligence Agency informed Secretary Mellamara that "certain intelligence gaps" were "related primarily to the types and amounts of weapons and materiel coming into South Vietnam, Lane the number of, Viet Cong personnel infiltrating into South Vietnam [42] To alleviate this situation, the JCS favored such measures as ground probes into Leos by CVI reconnaissance teams and low-level reconnaissance flights over the trail areas by GN and U.S. aircraft. The State Department, supported by CSD/ISA, opposed such operations as potentially damaging to our relations with the Laotian government.
In supporting Its recommendations and in its comments on State-ISA proposals, the JCS argued that an integrated approach should be taken to the security of Southeast Asia, with our actions in Laos closely related to those taken on behalf of South Vietnam. They saw the key problem for all of Southeast Asia as the DRV's aggressive intent. As they stated, "the root of the problem is in North Vietnam and must be dealt with there." [43] Moreover, they felt that reconnaissance operations into and over Iaos were justified because they say Laotion security as dependent on that of South Vietnam. "Laos," they argued, "would not be able to endure the establishment of a communist -- or pseudo neutralist -- state on its eastern flank." They criticized our "self-imposed restrictions" as tending to make the task in Vietnam "more complex, time-consuming, and in the end, more costly" and for possibly signalling enemies [44] "Irresolution to our Accordingly, they Implied that the United States should convince the Laotian Premier of the need to take direct action against the Viet Minh Infiltration through low-level reconnaissance and other cross: border operations -- but above all,
to carry out these actions in order to impress the DR with our resolve to deny its insurgents a sanctuary. In the specific context of recommending these kind of actions, they stated "that the time has come to lift the restrictions which limit the effectiveness of our military operations."[45]
The State-ISA policy view also regarded Laos and Vietnam as parts of the overall Southeast Asian problem, but in early 1964 their conception of how U.S. objectives might be achieved extended beyond the need to thwart the communist guerrilla threat. In this view, policy success meant
