II
PERCEPTION: OR THINGS AND THEIR DECEPTIVENESS[1]
[In this as in the preceding section apprehension is effected under conditions of sense. But whereas in the preceding type of consciousness the universality which knowledge implies and requires no sooner appeared than it melted away, here in Perception we start from a certain stability in the manner of apprehension, and a certain constancy in the content apprehended. The universality in this case satisfies more completely the demands of knowledge. The problem for further analysis is to find the form which the universal here assumes and to determine the way in which the unity of the object (the "thing") holds together its essential differences. The result shows that the unity of the thing qua unity is only admissible as an unqualified or non-sensuous unity. It is an universal, but as such, not conditioned by sense; it is a pure or "unconditioned" universal—a thought proper. Being undetermined by sense, it transcends sense-apprehensions, and so transcends perception proper, and compels the mind to adopt another cognitive attitude in order to apprehend it. This new attitude is Understanding.
The following section is thus indirectly an analysis of the principle and a criticism of the position of pure sensationalism. It shows that the doctrine "esse est percipi" must give way to the principle "esse est intelligi."]
Immediate certainty does not make the truth its own, for its truth is something universal, whereas certainty wants to deal with the This. Perception, on the other hand, takes what exists for it to be a universal. Universality being its principle in general, its moments immediately distinguished within it are also universal; I is a universal, and the object is a universal. That
- ↑ Cp. Wissenschaft der Logick, Buch 2, Absch. 2, Kap 1. Das Ding und seine Eigenschaften, etc.
