indefinite increase of energy of valuation in the subject. The moral end cannot be formulated in terms of any social content, however abstract, but only in terms of the function of the subject. The imperative, though an irreducible characteristic of the individual value series, cannot be applied in any absolute sense to any given social content without involving contradictions. Yet this imperative character of the individual value series expresses itself in continuous Zweck-setzung, however phenomenal and ephemeral the particular ends may be, and in this very function the essence of individual morality is found. Inner valuation occupies the unique position of getting its content out of reality, but at the same time, of forever negating the real in favor of new values which in turn determine reality itself.[1] So also Krueger sees in the mere functional end of "highest possible energy of valuation," independent of content, the essence of the ethical life.
We have considered thus at length these two possible methods of determining values, their consequences and difficulties, in order that we may properly understand and estimate a third possible position, which is receiving recognition at the present time. We have, accordingly, contrasted the individual series of the Self, and its peculiar meaning as a progressive irreversible series with reference to an imperative absolute, with the reversible serial order, which characterizes the life history of any phenomenal content of social valuation, in order that we may raise the question whether, instead of being related as mutually supplementary or contradictory, these series may not indeed be in some sense mutually indifferent. The system of objective values, conceived as a system of nature, has shown itself in certain respects refractory to the affirmation of the principles of individual valuation, at least in so far as the individual seeks in the system of nature a sanction for the absolute moment in his sense of value. May there not be a sense in which they are mutually indifferent to each other?
A certain pragmatic indifference of the individual sense or value to the consequences of a deterministic science is in the air. Those who have read Maeterlinck's essays on justice[2] have
