REVIEWS OF BOOKS.
The outstanding merit of Professor Ladd's book is its completeness. So far as I know, no other of our English text-books is so impartially full in its treatment of the various topics of ethical science. As a rule, the text-books are somewhat too exclusively or predominantly occupied with the discussion of the several types of abstract theory—a topic which Professor Ladd by contrast handles too briefly, and, in fact, rather tends to shelve as much as possible. On the other hand, so far as the more psychological topics are concerned, the practice is to select for discussion one or two of the more pressing, such as the object of desire, or of moral judgment, or the freedom of the will. And perhaps this restriction has a good deal to say for itself. What is less defensible, however, is the minimum of space that is usually devoted to the exposition of the more concrete principles of morality. Now, both in respect of the psychology of man's moral nature and the exposition of the concrete moral principles or virtues, Professor Ladd, on the contrary, follows a definite and comprehensive scheme of discussion. That the psychological aspect of morality would be fully and carefully discussed, was, indeed, only what we should have expected from a psychologist who has written so much upon his science. But the attention devoted to the concrete principles of morality or types of moral conduct, is a feature of the work which deserves to be specially noted and welcomed. A brief description of the contents of the work will most easily justify my statement as to its comprehensiveness. Apart from the introductory chapters, the book falls into three main divisions. The first is psychological, and treats of man's moral nature under the three heads of ethical feelings, ethical judgment, and volition or moral freedom. The second division, entitled "The Virtuous Life," may be subdivided roughly into two sections or halves, the first of which gives a descriptive account of the virtues, grouped according to the psychological tripartite scheme as virtues of the will, of the judgment, and of feeling respectively; while the second section gives an analysis of the conceptions of duty and moral law, and a discussion of some
