God as the ultimate principle of Christian morality. But how is this will known to men? Either, it would seem, by a supernatural revelation or by the study of nature, including, of course, human nature. If he declares for the former, he has the difficult task of exhibiting a clear, harmonious, and universally authoritative revelation; if for the latter, he must descend from the clouds and find the divine will in the facts of human experience. As the discussion stands, M. Halleux is left in an ambiguous position between the earth and sky. On the one hand, he declares that "la morale religieuse puise dans la considération de la vie future un criterium certain de la moralité de nos actes" (p. 169); on the other, that "la morale théologique ... place le fondement immédiat de la loi morale dans les relations naturelles des êtres" (p. 175). How can the consideration of a future life furnish a certain criterion of morality, when the very problem of morality is to determine what constitutes a worthful life, whether present or future, short or long? Indefinite extension or extension to infinity does not answer the question.
W. G. Everett.
Brown University.
Advantage has been taken of this opportunity to revise the entire work once more and to make many minor corrections. There are, however, only two alterations of real importance. These occur (1) in the statement of Butler's theory in terms of Eudsemonism, as well as of Rationalism (Part I, ch. iii, § 14), and (2) in the discussion of freedom, which is no longer identified with contingency or indetermination, but with self-determination. The latter change of view has led to the alterations of certain statements in Part III, ch. i, §§ 3-5, and to the omission of the criticism of Green's view of the relation of the self to the character (§§ 8, 9).
J. S.
W. Wundt's Philosophie und Psychologie, In ihren Grundlehren dargestellt. Von Rudolf Eisler. Leipzig, J. A. Barth, 1902.—pp. vi, 210. }}
The scope and purpose of these volumes is in general the same. They both present in a compact form an exposition of Wundt's views on the fundamental questions of philosophy and psychology. Konig's method of treatment was undoubtedly determined largely by the character of the series for which his book was written. The first forty-nine pages deal with Wundt's relation to other current philosophical movements, and with an account of
