to the pleasure derived from witnessing distress. The implications of interest may be made clear by an example. The interest manifested in the respect which one has for the efficiency of others "can be explained only if we suppose that each individual has a natural tendency to make his existence effective in some way" (p. 113).
The primary principles of activity, or ways in which the primary tendencies express themselves, are discussed under such headings as : the tendency of function to realize itself; the principle of inertia; sociability; self-preservation and self-assertion; the property instinct; the destructive and constructive instincts; and the various forms of each.
"But if man were endowed only with the tendencies already mentioned, no system of conduct would be possible. Each individual would be resolved into a multiplicity of warring elements" (p. 144). It is thus the problem of the last chapter is introduced. Here psychology surrenders the discussion to ethics. To make a system possible, an all-inclusive end is necessary. Is there a supreme end of intrinsic worth? An ideal of worth is presupposed by the facts of admiration and scorn, which are excited by the presence or absence of worth in others. The sense of personal dignity, the feeling of shame, the sense of propriety are intelligible only by reference to an ideal of worth. "This ideal of worth has the characteristics of a supreme regulative principle, for it furnishes an all-inclusive end, a universal criterion, and a supreme motive" (p. 150).
But what modes of behavior are worthy of the individual? What does the supreme end require? "The supreme end is the realization by the individual of his distinctive capacities" (p. 159). "The content of moral obligation is defined by the distinctive nature of the individual and of his environment, that is, by his place in the system of things " (p. 172).
It is thus Dr. Irons sums up the results of his inquiry. "The psychical individual as such has a definite character which expresses itself in a multiplicity of primary reactions. These reactions are directly conditioned by the constitution of his nature; are not determined by pleasure-pain; and are themselves the sources of hedonic results. They also give significance to persons, things, and events. When this significance is recognized, a peculiar reaction of feeling takes place which is called 'emotion.' The various emotions are different feelings in reference to different objects, and give rise to special impulses. All these particular tendencies assert themselves as opportunity offers, and if left to themselves are perpetually at variance with
