than in the earlier work. And while the volume can hardly be said to raise our opinion of its author's critical acumen, it throws no little light upon several points in his own theory, and by the very limitations of insight which it reveals, especially in the criticism of the transcendental theory, enables us better to understand the alternative accepted by Sidgwick and his reasons for its acceptance. It is peculiarly instructive, as well as often entertaining, to be privileged to 'assist' at Sidgwick's personal encounters with the critics of his own theory; and the comparative freedom of the lecture style allows him to develop a gift of humor which the reader of the Methods would hardly have suspected. We can easily believe the editor's statement that the lectures were "listened to with delight" by Professor Sidgwick's pupils. They might well be taken as models of what academic lectures to advanced pupils ought to be.
The discussion of Spencer and Martineau may be passed over lightly by the reviewer. In the case of Martineau, it may be questioned whether the intrinsic importance of the theory warrants its inclusion in such a course of lectures, at least in their published form; still the fact that Sidgwick considered the theory important enough to be treated along with the other two, and that the discussion of it gives him the opportunity of differentiating the intuitional element in his own theory from the intuitionism of the 'Common Sense' school, as well as from Martineau's peculiar version of the theory, is perhaps a sufficient reason for its publication in the present volume. The chief points in the discussion had already, however, been made by the author in his criticism of Martineau in The Methods of Ethics (Bk. iii, ch. 12).
The discussion of Spencer occupies the largest space, but is largely devoted to what Sidgwick calls "the details of Utilitarian politics." The main point which he is concerned to establish against Spencer is the impossibility of exchanging the empirical for the 'rational' or deductive method, or of making utilitarianism 'scientific,' by connecting hedonism with evolutionism or 'relative' with 'absolute' ethics. By a consideration of particular cases, after his own manner, Sidgwick has no difficulty in showing not only that in all these cases "we have to fall back on empirical utilitarianism," but that Spencer himself illustrates this necessity in his own procedure. For the most part, indeed, he finds Spencer's own utilitarianism "empirical to triviality," and he is never more effective or entertaining than when he is engaged in exposing the commonplaceness and triviality that underlie the pompous technical language and scientific phraseology of Mr.
