ders it to any extent incompetent ; for that is just the matter to be interpreted the relative normal "incompetence" of the creature in comparison with man. Certain positive results of Mr. Hobhouse's investigations are noted below.
Third, the author discusses evolution. This is the least valuable feature—except the next noted—of the book. The attempt to construe evolution under general descriptive formulations is bound to be merely verbal, as Mr. Spencer demonstrated long ago. Such formulations are interesting from the point of view of general philosophy—as, for example, Mr. Spencer's definition of life. Mr. Hobhouse's formulation is thus interesting. It emphasizes the gradually increasing dominance of mind in evolution. But, except in so far as it aids in the further interpretation of facts—and it is hard to see how it can—the interest terminates there. Furthermore, it shows the dominance of the philosophical preconception of Mr. Hobhouse in the way indicated in the next paragraph.
Fourth, mental development (and evolution) is construed under a logical formula or analogy. An implicit inferential process is discovered in the simplest mental functions—especially those of adjustment and accommodation—and mental progress is looked for and recognized as the development of such assumed process into explicit logical function. All this is to the writer so much confusion, psychologist's fallacy, and irrelevancy. It is hard to see the motive for it, except the interests of an idealistic epistemology. It is further a distinct confusion of the psychic (agent's) and objective (spectator's) points of view. The book would be greatly strengthened as a contribution to scientific psychology were this strain of logicism expunged.
So far the general features of Mr. Hobhouse's book; for details the reader may consult discussions of it which have already appeared (e.g. in the Psychological Review, 1902, p. 508). As to the net result, the present writer is interested in the following:
1. The theory of what Mr. Hobhouse calls "practical judgment" in animals, and his evidence in support of it. By "practical judgment" he means a stage in the animal's accomplishment at which he seems to be able to use items of earlier experience somewhat out of their original setting, for practical purposes, that is, for the purpose of relatively new adjustments.[1] I think he is fairly successful in establishing such a function. It indicates—if finally made out—a stage in the growth of experience between association proper and the use of
- ↑ Thus stated in my own words; I find Mr. Hobhouse's many versions of it not entirely consistent with one another, nor always clear.
