rect reasoning and the social duty of veracity for the rationalists of the seventeenth century, by the late development of the historic conscience, and by the purely social end of intolerance in its first manifestations. Three principal causes brought about the appearance of intellectual veracity as a virtue: (a) the increasing importance of science in the amelioration of human life; (b) the diffusion of instruction; (c) the division of scientific labor, which for a long time was both an individual task and purely speculative. Technical knowledge, when it finally appears, is a social interest of the first rank. It required division of labor, and thus the veracity of the collaborators became essential. With it comes the recognized need of universal instruction, as the value of a man to society depends on his intellectual ability. The idea of the duty of all to extend truth appears side by side with that of the right of all men to enjoy truth. Truth thus becomes a social good, and in consequence its requisite, intellectual veracity, becomes a virtue. The question whether veracity is nothing more than a virtue is of course absurd, if one defines morality a priori as an absolute, and therefore refuses to recognize a principle as moral unless it is at the same time a limit. But this is arbitrary, and it is not absurd to say that there is, in a certain sense, something superior to morality, and to ask how morality is related to this superior principle. This principle, which makes us averse to deception even when salutary or ethically justified, is the search for 'harmony with one's self,' for affirmation instead of negation. But by its generality this principle is logical and rational, not moral; its obligation is formal, while that of morality is real. Yet in veracity we have a special case in which the real matter of obligation and its abstract form almost coincide. Logically and psychologically, then, veracity is a privileged duty. Its reasons extend beyond morality, and are both more general and more special than those of other duties. Ideally imposed by metaphysical necessity, it is like the other real virtues empirically founded on the data of human society. The mistake of the intellectualist theory is that it does not see the specific character of morality, and arbitrarily makes it absolute, thus losing all its real content. Edmund H. Hollands.
The world of practice should share in those benefits which philosophic thought may furnish. Social institutions exist that they may minister to human needs, but in their effort to meet man's practical wants they may overlook his higher interests. The highest of these is the free movement of thought in religion and the question is: How far is conformity to be exacted in matters of religion? In particular, what attitude ought to be taken toward the imposition of religious tests upon teachers in England and elsewhere? The objection to such tests arises from the fact that the results of the scientific method which are authoritative in secular investigations conflict with traditional Biblical interpretation. If religion is to be
