observer appear as beautiful or ugly. The moral and æsthetic judgments are, indeed, closely akin; the similarity of their mode of functioning, which has even led some thinkers to regard the one as a species of the other, or, at times, to posit an æsthetic element in moral feeling,—points to a recent genetic connection. In defining the distinction between the two, it is not sufficient to say, as we may, that the moral judgment views the volition as an expression of character; for character also is not beyond the range of aesthetic objects. An act of treason, for example, may be superbly tragic in its revelation of egoistic depravity.
The distinctive mark of that species of worth which we call moral is that it is measured by the satisfaction of a self-conscious person as a harmonious totality. Such a person is aware within himself of many appetites and desires pressing for satisfaction; and, recognizing himself to be other and more than any particular want, he conceives his peculiar satisfaction or happiness as realized, not in the satisfaction of any one of them or arbitrary sum of them as such, but in a certain coordination which allows to each a measured place. The notion of a character, or volitional disposition, in which such a coördination is effected, is the moral ideal.
The term 'harmonious' raises more questions than it puts to rest. A harmony of whatever sort must have its one or several underlying principles or laws, which fix within certain limits the proportions of its parts. Thus the harmony of aesthetic symmetry may depend upon the natural and immediate pleasantness of curves or rhythms, or of combinations of colors or sounds presented in fitting masses and intensities. The beautiful object is no mere many in one; it is a many that has a reason for combining in one in just such fashion as it exemplifies. So the moral ideal, as a peculiar harmony, must have its peculiar rational ground, which it is incumbent upon ethical science to discover. Among the many methods which have been applied to this end, the genetic study of the life of ethical norms in societies and in individuals furnishes one of the most promising. However, let us leave the question aside for the present, remembering still that without such supplementation the definition of morality is confessedly abstract and inadequate.
