of Religious Experience. This movement is regarded by Professor James as belonging to the general tendency toward 'healthy-mindedness,' or a deliberately adopted attitude of optimism, which, in his opinion; is psychologically reasonable. The rapid spread of the 'New Thought' among the American people is due chiefly to its practical appeal. Its speculative side, which is the aspect of interest to psychology, rests on the same basis as does all religious experience,—the existence of a dual nature in man. All religions agree in the belief in a higher or spiritual nature in man, which is in direct relation to a Divine Order, and in the possibility of escape from evil by habitually living in harmony with this higher nature. The relation of the 'New Thought' to modern psychology is found in the identification of this higher nature with the subliminal consciousness. By relaxation, which is a practical recognition of the union of the higher self with the Universal Mind, the ' New Thought ' asserts that it is possible to obtain divine help, and to gain a revelation of truth transcending ordinary knowledge. As a religious practice, this is not new, but is similar to 'conversion' and to various phenomena of mysticism found thoughout religious history. Psychologically, relaxation means a shift of the center of the field of consciousness, which allows subliminal processes, hitherto inhibited, to cross the threshold. An analogous experience is the recovery of a forgotten name, when the direct effort to recall it is relaxed. This attitude of relaxation, even if admitted to be merely a subjective condition, has marked effects upon action and endurance, and must hence be regarded as an important biological function. But while psychology affirms the existence of a subliminal consciousness, and emphasizes its importance as a factor in experience, it offers neither proof nor disproof of its relation to a Divine consciousness.
Grace Mead Andrus.
ETHICS AND ÆSTHETICS.
The title of this article suggests one of the most interesting of recent movements, as represented by MM. Lévy-Bruhl, Durkheim, Wundt, Bouglé, and Simmel. According to the first of these, morality is a political or pedagogical art, its object being society or the individual. But really this presupposes the true morality of which an account is to be given. Conflicting ends necessitate choice, and this, in turn, deliberation, a hierarchy of goods, a criterion of ends, and moral formulæ. The criterion is the concept of the summum bonum, the formulæ are the moral laws. Erroneous moral theory no more destroys obligation than an erroneous theory of light alters the retinal sensation. Since reason and instinct may conflict, moral rules, to have any validity, must be based on the acknowledged authority of reason to arbitrate in conduct. Traditional morality has only
