that it is illogical? But why should nature not have this prerogative?
The space is lacking to allow of many more comments. It is evident that the new theory of mutations must be recognized in all discussions of questions as to origin and development. For instance, if the empirical view of consciousness be taken, why should it not be quite possible that this has appeared in the phylogenetic development of certain species as a mutation? And what becomes of those arguments for design which have been based on adaptation by slow accumulative changes? Evidently the work of de Vries may well prove to be an epoch-making contribution to the advance of knowledge. It makes the study of evolution in part experimental, modifies the current views as to origin, selection, and adaptation, and finds a place for non-heredity and discontinuity, for chance and irregularity.
| Edward G. Spaulding |
| College of the City of New York. |
