work being done? It would not be difficult to show that this constantly reiterated criticism was lacking in justice, even if not absolutely without foundation, for it is most difficult to draw the line between critical and constructive work. This is true even in natural science, where the persistent and rigorous criticism of a theory not infrequently leads to its gradual transformation into something very different. In truth, original, consistent, thoroughgoing criticism, whether in natural science or in philosophy, must always be constructive in an important sense; for its originality plainly involves a departure from the conventional point of view, while consistency, here as elsewhere, is only possible according to definite known principles.
But while this is not only true, but fairly evident, the philosophical world is certainly to be congratulated upon the growing tendency on the part of serious writers on philosophy to state their views, or those of the school which they represent, in more systematic fashion. Not that the writers who do this most helpfully make any extravagant claims to originality. Most fortunately philosophy, like natural science, has become largely a matter of methods, inviting coöperation, instead of a collection of more or less mutually exclusive systems. But the self-corrective, self-supplementing tendency of truly rational thought asserts itself to the best advantage, when the treatment is at once comprehensive and according to a definite plan; and methods which at first seem radically opposed often show much in common, if consistently applied on a large scale, and without too immediate reference to their supposed practical consequences.
Mr. Bradley, perhaps, did more to wake us from our latter-day 'dogmatic slumber' and suggest a bolder attitude toward the essential problems of metaphysics than to define the grounds of possible agreement. But Professor Royce has done much to vindicate the more catholic conception of philosophy as progressive reasonableness, whose true function is to supplement and develop from within our imperfect apprehensions of reality; and within the past two years three of our other well-known writers have attempted again the difficult task of treating of philosophy as a whole. The recent works by Professor Taylor and Professor Fullerton have already been examined at length in this Review, and now we have to consider the first two of the five proposed volumes on The Life of Reason, by Professor Santayana, bearing the titles, "Introduction and Reason in Common Sense" and "Reason in Society."
Different as the systematic works of Professor Taylor and Professor Fullerton otherwise are, they are alike in that they both attempt a
