æsthetic feelings to a rational control, so that they shall be in harmony with each other, with truth, and with our interest and our self-respect. "Reason is not pure dialectic, abstract reasoning. It is organization, finality, harmony. The reasonable man is the man of balance, who has eliminated all incoherence from his convictions and his aspirations, who seeks with all his energies an end worthy of his efforts. By rational beauty I mean what such a man would admire" (p. 98). In this extended volume the author first vindicates the use of reason in art and criticism and æsthetic feeling, criticising the impressionist and subjectivist methods; then, starting from the definition of beauty as 'evident perfection,' he proceeds to apply and verify it in the three following sections: on the beauty of sense, intellectual beauty, and moral beauty. This perfection is absolute, independent of us, and can, therefore, clearly be only finality in the object,—an end or ideal realized to our view. A corollary to this is that the full æsthetic experience is a deliberate judgment, an attribution of value, a certificate of excellence. Feelings of pleasure may, indeed, enter into the complex; but they cannot determine æsthetic value, and in the case of possible conflict, must give way before the judgment as to the perfection of the object in itself. To the obvious objection that this theory obliterates the distinction between the beautiful, the useful, and the good, M. Souriau rejoins that this is just what he has in mind. Usefulness is a quality that makes for beauty, without completely attaining to it." Between the beautiful and the good, I see only a difference of degree: the beautiful is the good carried to such a degree that it deserves to excite admiration. When an organic being has no deformity, it is good; when it perfectly realizes the type of its species, it is beautiful. Strict probity in action will give the impression of moral goodness; heroic courage, complete abnegation, will give an impression of beauty" (p. 503).
It is clear that this thesis will be sustained with least difficulty in the field of organic life; and accordingly we find the chapters on physical well-being, beauty and physical charm, the beauty of organization, of movement, of expression in nature and in living beings, and the relation of art and morality, especially convincing. It appears to me, however, that a difficulty at once arises with the discussion of physical and intellectual functions, and their satisfaction. In treating of physical well-being, the author says we divine from our sensations a 'physiological beauty,' or perfection of vital activity; and we attribute beauty to other living beings from the signs of physiological perfection. It is the vitality itself which is the object of
