without having metaphysical and epistemological problems thrust upon us. In this field more than in the natural scientific domain questions of a philosophical nature come up which cannot be brushed aside. By refusing to consider them or branding them as absurd the investigator does not silence them. Unconsciously he assumes some attitude toward them, which guides him all along the line. The questions are not always openly asked, but they are generally silently answered, and the answers are assumed without further ado. All this becomes evident enough when we call to mind that the different psychologists accuse each other of being metaphysicians. The empirio-criticists, who claim to have escaped the contagion, flout Wundt as a metaphysician in psychology, and Wundt lays bare the metaphysical assumptions of the Kritik of Pure Experience. They are both right. There is no absolutely presuppositionless psychology, and there never will be such a psychology. The sooner we accept this fact and examine the presuppositions of our science, the less inclination will we show to break away from philosophy and join the ranks of the natural scientists.
| Frank Thilly |
| Princeton University.. |
matter the same or different? It is impossible to answer these questions without making assumptions of a metaphysical and epistemological nature. That is what Professor Münsterberg means when he says: "The approach to psychology must proceed from philosophy.… With the psychological problems themselves philosophy has nothing to do; the question, however, what is psychology, what can it be, what ought it to be, is a wholly philosophical question." Grundzüge der Psychologie, Vol. I, pp. 1, 2.
