the pages which follow, is simply an orderly presentation of facts; and the interpretation of the facts is nothing more than a statement of the ultimate uniformities they present—the laws to which they conform."[1]
Owing to the subjective character of so many preceding systems of philosophy, the idea has become fixed in some academic circles that philosophy is identical with metaphysics, and the deductions, true or false, that can be drawn from metaphysical premises. In consequence, a large part of the criticism of Spencer's system has been directed to his metaphysical ideas, and many critics have assumed that when they have, to their own satisfaction, disposed of this part of his work, there is no necessity to trouble further with the philosophy. This is of course a grave error.
It is only fair to these critics to admit that, in some respects, some parts of Spencer's exposition, especially in earlier editions, give an excuse for the assumption that there is an essential connection between the two.
"Every antecedent mode of the Unknowable must have an invariable connection, quantitative and qualitative, with that mode of the Unknowable which we call its consequent."[2]
"By the Persistence of Force, we really mean the persistence of some cause which transcends our knowledge and conception. In asserting it we assert an Unconditioned Reality without be- ginning or end."[3]
Passages like these, and the occasional recurrence of such ideas throughout his philosophy, are liable to be misunderstood. Those who read his works without a thorough grasp of the conceptions involved, and those in search of useful controversial matter, will note these peculiarities, and, in consequence, gravely misunderstand the objects and aims of the philosophy. These are distinct flaws in an otherwise excellent exposition, which will, however, present no difficulty to those who are in sympathy with the main trend of his ideas. One great difference between the works of Spencer and those of many modern philosophers is that, while
