Page:Philosophical Review Volume 19.djvu/543

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529
KANT'S THEORY OF ETHICS.
[Vol. XIX.

only in Categorical Imperatives, and, confronting his wishes and inclinations, claims to be the perpetual controller of his actions; in this figure we see no true portrait of human nature, or of our inner life; what we do discern is an artificial substitute for theological Morals, to which it stands in the same relation as a wooden leg to a living one."[1] But, one may ask, what are the practical implications of Schopenhauer's own pessimistic Weltanschauung, and of the ethics of sympathy and self-obliteration which he bases upon it? Whither does Schopenhauer's own morality lead? What are its chances of realization, and what its ultimate goal? A careful consideration of these questions would reveal the narrowness of Schopenhauer's own point of view, and his radical misconception of human nature, which is evident in his inadequate statement of the moral problem.

On Schopenhauer's own basis, epistemological and metaphysical, egoism is the normal, healthy mode of conduct. What Schopenhauer calls the egoistic 'illusion' allows, none the less, of the will's manifesting itself in him, and, through his species, rising to ever higher planes of objectification. Man is what he is because of his making nature fight his battles; or, perhaps better, because of his fighting the battles of nature, for this is what Schopenhauer calls being the slave of the tyrant Will. If, however, by understanding the true nature of the World-Reality, man could hasten by his own endeavor the progress of evolution, then such an 'enslavement' would be an undoubted desideratum. Yes, Schopenhauer says, if the game were worth the candle! This is, then, the crucial point in the entire discussion. If there were a balance of weal, to compensate the effort expended, who would not slave? Alas, says Schopenhauer, but "life is a business which does not cover its expenses."[2] The only basis of weal, of real happiness, is the calm of a quieted spirit. Desire is the very essence of Will, and it is essentially painful.[3] Amend the Will we cannot, for it is our very essence; but we can end it.[4] The ethical hero realizes the vanity of it all, and turns his back upon

  1. G., III, p. 549; B., pp. 103-104.
  2. G., II, p. 280; HK., II, p. 461.
  3. Cf. G., II, pp. 676 ff.; HK. III, pp. 384 ff.
  4. Cf. W. Wallace, Life of Arthur Schopenhauer, London, 1890, p. 137.