THE NOTION OF THE IMPLICIT IN LOGIC.[1]
THE notion of the Implicit or Potential, in some form or other, has been regarded as an essential and valuable philosophical idea since the time of Aristotle. Though at the present day we do not apply it as a principle of cosmic explanation with the confidence of the earlier Idealists, the notion still plays a great part, especially in all sciences dealing with the phenomena and achievements of life and mind. Nevertheless, in logical discussions its use and mode of employment have been from time to time sharply challenged, not merely by the representatives of the view that each element of experience is in its own nature distinct and separate from every other, but also by the Idealists, the champions of continuity. The latter, indeed, attack only the uncritical and mechanical employment of the idea, and seek to distinguish sharply between the significant application of the concept, and its abuse as a merely verbal and abstract term.
In certain recent discussions, however, the Idealists are themselves represented as still under the fatal spell of the 'potential' and of allied verbal terms, and I seem to perceive a tendency in some quarters to scoff openly at the Idealist's formulas, or at best to listen with a kind of humorous tolerance to his frequent references to presuppositions of experience, and the becoming explicit of what was formerly only implicit. It would be easy to retort in kind, for every school has its formulas. But it is rather the part of wisdom for the Idealist to rethink his favorite concepts in order to fix and define their legitimate use, and to inquire what clear ideas attach themselves to the words which he commonly employs to express them.
My remarks will take as their point of departure Professor Baldwin's recent discussions of the concept of the Implicit. As is well known, Professor Baldwin, after dealing in a series of works with the general principles of evolution, as well as with their special applications to the mind of the child and the race, has
- ↑ Read before the Baltimore meeting of the American Philosophical Association, December, 1908.
