universal presupposition of experience, and its ends and demands must be regarded as necessary both to explain experience at every stage, and to furnish the dynamic or moving principle throughout the whole course of its development. In any genuine course of development the end is functionally effective from the beginning; hence a theory of logic is necessarily a description or analysis in terms of teleology.
In conclusion, I would repeat that these conceptions do not render unnecessary a detailed account of the development of knowledge. They are intended to apply only to the question regarding the terms in which the account of its development is to be written. No one can doubt that the mind in its early stages of development is almost entirely immersed in practice, and that its functions appear to be directed only to the satisfaction of practical desires. But, if the genetic viewpoint is to be retained, it is necessary to maintain that the cognitive mind was never merely practical, but that, even in its first beginnings, logical functions and logical meanings were not entirely lacking though for the time overshadowed by more pressing interests. Genetic logic is then the story of the gradual emancipation of the logical mind from the direct control of the practical through the working out of the principles which constitute its own essential nature.
| J. E. Creighton |
| Cornell University.. |
