its means, not as to its ends. The error is also made of asserting a purely mechanical determination instead of a logical one embracing both causality and teleology. Yet this standpoint can consistently allow within its mechanism neither subjective purpose nor responsibility. The moralistic view is essentially autonomous. Its truth lies in the fact that it goes beyond the merely natural sphere, if not as to its means, yet so far as its source (unselfish disposition) and aims (unselfish moral conduct of life) are concerned, that it transforms the objective purposes of the world into subjective laws and recognizes the self-created moral law as absolute norm. It fails when it regards the moral sphere as the highest and changes the mediate teleological value of the same into an immediate one, when it forgets that morality is a means to absolutely supra-moral ends and overlooks the reflection of the supra-moral in the spiritual life of man, in art, science, and religion. It is right in making moral responsibility the cardinal point of human life, in rejecting purely mechanical causation, in combating fatalism, wrong in its indeterminism and absolute responsibility. The supra-moralistic position holds when it considers the moral sphere as a means to higher ends, but errs in emancipating man from the moral law and in referring responsibility wholly to God. We must agree with this theory when it declares the germ of moral disposition from which morality proceeds to be a phase of divine grace; we find fault with it for ignoring the natural means placed at the disposal of the will for self-determination. According to the first standpoint there is no objective good or bad; according to the second the moral law is absolute, the gods themselves being subject to it; according to the third God stands beyond the pale of morality, while man's acts are good in so far as they conform to the will of God. (We have, corresponding to these different ethical conceptions, different views of science, art, and religion.) None of these three theories taken by itself is true. Their truth lies in their union. Let us say, then, that moral willing is determined. Since it autonomously transforms objective purposes into moral laws, its teleology transcends natural teleology, which pursues ends without being conscious of their obligation. The causal or mechanical world order is but a means of the teleological natural order, the latter a means of the moral world order, which in its turn serves the ends of the supra-moral plan of salvation. The ultimate goal is conceived by the religious consciousness as redemption. Universal redemption = the return of all things to God, individual redemption = the ideal anticipation of the real. We live morally, in order to reach supra-moral ends. The supra-moral is not only the end but also the ground of morality. A supra-moral God is immanent in man, the religious consciousness, therefore, the immediate and final sanction and profoundest source of moral consciousness. Religion is neither a
