it ought not to be suppressed, indeed all attempts to do so would prove unavailing. In short, altruism is as much a fundamental fact of nature as its opposite, and we might reduce egoism to altruism as easily as we now do the reverse. Egoism may be a strategy on the part of nature to reach altruistic ends (p. 107). At any rate, "when a group acts as a unit, individual egoism as the sole means of race-advancement is dethroned" (p. 114). We cannot help agreeing with the author that even if egoism were the most suitable means of producing social welfare, it might still be rejected as an ultimate ethical principle. An ethical principle needs no proof. Morality is ultimately based on feeling. In view of these results, a sentence like the following is significant. "If any one should maintain that he feels the absolute exercise of egoism as a moral duty, this would have to be accepted as a fact as indisputable as a similar assertion concerning altruism" (p. 119).
After having discussed the egoistic impulse at such length, Dr. Simmel suddenly comes to the conclusion that it is impossible to find a content for the notion. The 'I' is a combination of so many impulses, desires, ideals. To say that the egoist seeks his own interest means "dass er will was er will" (p. 135). This, it seems to me, is a merely verbal definition of the notion. If we take it in so broad a sense, it must, of course, become colorless. Every act of will might then be stamped as selfish; selfishness and willing would become interchangeable terms. We might discover ourselves reasoning as follows: an egoist is a man who seeks to further himself. Now his self is composed of a number of impulses, among which the altruistic tendencies belong. An egoist, therefore, would be one who realizes his other-regarding feelings, or, an egoist is not an egoist. These sophistical fallacies we can easily avoid by restricting the meaning of the term. In the selfish man the altruistic impulses are either wanting altogether or not so strongly developed as their opposites. It is true that we define each term by negating the other, but this simply shows the impossibility of defining our feelings.
The chapter on moral desert and guilt regards desert as the correlate of obligation, "it signifies that others ought to do something in reference to me" (p. 214). Ideal ethical desert means that one is worthy of real reward. These are categories created by social intercourse. It is found necessary to reward certain modes of conduct, afterwards these categories are still applied to qualities, even though the original reactions no longer take place. An action is
