same time seek to answer the problems presented to it by the external world concerning its origin and ultimate principles. The question is, How can two objects so essentially different be included in the same science? Philosophy, in dealing with the facts of consciousness, must be reflective, but in seeking to get a view of the world, as a whole, it is necessarily synthetic. In the act of thinking, however, we find the spirit of reflection and the spirit of synthesis united. Philosophy can then be defined as the science of thought, or, with Aristotle, as thought of thought. This definition will apply to all the philosophical sciences. Metaphysics, indeed, which seeks the highest possible universal must be regarded as seeking to embrace in this not only thought in the psychological sense, but also Being. It is concerned with the object, with nature, but it seeks in it the thinkable, the intelligible. Nature is an unconscious thought, a thought in itself. The problem of Metaphysics is to show how the thought in itself, corresponds with the thought for itself. In this sense we can say that Metaphysics, too, is the thought of thought. Using this definition as a criterion, J. finds that, beginning with the lowest, the following order indicates the relative values of the different systems: Materialism, Positivism, Subjective Phenomenalism (J. S. Mill, Taine), Criticism, Idealism. This latter philosophy is higher than the Critical in that it does not leave subject and object standing apart, but unites them both in an absolute thought. It may, however, be given either a Spiritualistic or a Pantheistic, interpretation. The former is the higher and truer doctrine, for it frees the infinite thought from the limits of the finite thought, and it emphasizes the subject rather than the object.
J. E. C.
Metaphysical belief deals with that which is beyond phenomena, that is, beyond consciousness. Its justification does not lie in its necessity to a completed system of knowledge. It has its source outside of pure logic in the exercise of free will. Belief is not always voluntary, but an act of free will may confirm a belief in the first instance involuntary. Will alone cannot make belief, for belief is a judgment. It has power, however, over the facts of consciousness on which judgment is founded. The part played by the will is greater, as there is less preparation for the belief in the facts of the phenomenal world, as it is more difficult to characterize the reasons for belief,
