and above the ideas which form the matter of the belief, but a mode of behaviour of those ideas themselves. Belief, by this theory, is defined as a spontaneous association of ideas, an image spontaneously arising and maintained. When a certain subject and predicate, or, to put it more exactly, the components of a mental image, spontaneously maintain their connection apart from any effort of our will, we have the phenomenon of belief; the intensity of the belief being proportional to the tendency of the ideas to maintain, or, when deliberately separated, to resume their connection.
Which of these two representative theories is nearer the truth, it does not concern us to inquire. Both may very well be correct. A spontaneous association may, in all cases, as a matter of fact, be accompanied by the peculiar emotion of which Professor James speaks. At all events it does not appear that contemporary psychology finds any especial mystery in the phenomenon of belief, or observes it to perform any feats of self-transcendence. When we say that a man believes, we are either stating the fact that his mind contains a certain element, or that the contents of his mind behave in a certain way, or are affirming both these propositions.
And now let us turn to our consideration of the second or reflective moment of knowledge. It occurs to me that my thought of my friend's mind was incorrect. I have ascribed to him some strong prejudice from which he is free, or I have withheld from him some excellence that he possesses. What occurences in the mind do these words figure? It does not seem hard to say. Over against my first mental picture a second has arisen with which I compare the first. This second picture may be a more complete one; a keener attention and interest may have spurred my memory. This second picture I call 'my real friend,' 'my friend's mind as it really is'; I mean those words are the verbal sign to me of the second, and as yet of nothing else. My first image, which has by this time called up to itself associates of the kind distinguished as subjective – acquired, that is to say, a personal setting – I call 'my thought of my friend.' When I ask in such a doubtful moment, 'Did
