conduct proper (for the sake of preservation) to human beings living together in the associated state. This state can be maintained only by effectual co-operation, both for external defence and internal sustentation. In early societies, in which war is the normal condition, the morality of external enmity prevails. As war dies out, the morality of internal amity, which is necessary for peaceful industry, comes to the front; and the continuance of these conditions favors the growth of an international morality of amity, which is at present slowly developing in civilized countries. But this goal is unattainable so long as wars survive. "Hence the fact that we have a thin layer of Christianity overlaying a thick layer of paganism" (p. 323). Our generation acts at one time on the principles of the morals of amity, at another time on those of the morals of enmity, and for the most part without recognizing the contradiction.
In the light of the foregoing analysis, the diversity of moral sentiments, ideas, and judgments is easily explained. And ethical science must take account of what peoples, in all stages of civilization, regard as right, obligation, and duty. Here murder and lying are prescribed, there veracity and respect of life. We treat smoking as a morally indifferent act; some Mahomedan tribes consider it one of the worst offences. But the science of ethics must reckon alike with our moral code, and with codes which do violence to all our moral sentiments. An act is to be described as ethical whenever, in the minds of those performing it, there is a consciousness of authority, of coercion, and of public opinion, which results in an idea and feeling of obligation. Or rather, since this consciousness is one of external constraint enforced by extrinsic results, such an act should, in strictness, be designated pro-ethical, though with the mass of mankind it stands in the place of what is truly ethical. The true moral consciousness refers solely to the intrinsic results of conduct. Few minds possess it. Hence in the inductive treatment of ethics it is with the pro-ethical feelings and ideas and virtues that we are almost exclusively occupied.
Mr. Spencer pursues the morality of external enmity and the morality of internal amity through chapters on aggression, robbery, revenge, justice, generosity, humanity, veracity, obedience, industry, temperance, and chastity. The chapters are rich in sociological materials, showing how differently these notions are regarded by different peoples. The results are given by Mr. Spencer himself in an admirable summary (pp. 467-468):
