Page:Philosophical Review Volume 2.djvu/538

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THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.
[Vol. II.

"the truth" to be "for God alone," without at the same time holding that the subject's consciousness of himself is under the same spell of illusion as other objects? If not, the very fact that the conscious subject appears to himself as 'unique' is the strongest reason for affirming that in reality, or as he is known by God, he is not 'unique.' We ought, therefore, to discard the term 'knowledge' with its misleading associations. Man literally 'walks in a vain show,' having no real apprehension of God, the world or himself.

3. That Mr. Seth has not realised the profoundly sceptical character of the opposition of knowledge and existence seems to be shown by his assertion that to God we must apply "the highest category within our reach." Here at least two assumptions are made, neither of which can be justified from our author's point of view. The first is, that we are entitled to speak of higher and lower categories at all. For such a distinction implies that one category is more adequate to the expression of real existence than another. How can this be maintained by one who holds that "the truth is for God alone"? Were it possible for us to contemplate existence from the divine point of view, we should find that self-consciousness as we experience it is not applicable to God. How, then, can we, who are incapable of so contemplating existence, tell whether the category of self-consciousness is higher or lower, or identical with other categories? Nay, as existence, whatever it may be, must be essentially different from what we conceive it to be, higher and lower can from the ultimate point of view have no meaning whatever. Has not Mr. Seth himself told us that every category is an abstraction, which is inadequate to express the nature of existence? So that even the category of 'being' has no application to God, and might mean 'not-being,' were it not that even 'not-being' is meaningless. It will of course be answered that, though no category is adequate, the categories which we apply to other forms of existence have a certain analogical truth or symbolical sense. Thus, we may affirm that God is 'eternal' or persists through time, if only we are careful to note that the real manner of his existence cannot