Page:Philosophical Review Volume 2.djvu/542

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THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.
[Vol. II.

positive consciousness of the absence of all attributes which would still be predication, and very decided predication too—but it is the absence of consciousness itself. Thus Mr. Seth can from his point of view banish the 'metaphysical phantom of the thing in itself' only if he banishes all consciousness; for, whether we speak of 'knowledge,' or of 'faith,' there must be some distinction, and therefore judgment with its 'universal.' The 'thing in itself,' in short, is just the counterpart of the least determinate judgment we can form—the judgment that something 'is.' To say that the 'universal' is in this case 'such a little one' does not alter its character, and therefore consistency demands that we should eliminate reality altogether. It would be hard to find a stronger confirmation of what I have maintained above, that Mr. Seth's doctrine is fundamentally sceptical. It is also obvious, I think, that to be conscious of self implies some distinction within consciousness, and therefore some degree of predication or judgment. Mr. Seth's view of predication thus leads to the conclusion,—already shown in another way to follow from his whole mode of thought,—that the subject can no more have a knowledge of himself than of objects, and hence that there can be no real psychology on his theory. To this it may be added, that our author's defence of his now famous saying, "the individual alone is the real," does not weaken the objections raised above to his conceptions of God and the Self, but confirms their force. For him God is still in existence and nature beyond knowledge, and conscious subjects are still, if not "absolutely and for ever exclusive," at least "mutually exclusive centres of existence " (2d ed. p. 135). I do not myself understand how such a God can be legitimately affirmed to exist at all, or how there can be a 'centre' where there is no circumference, or how the subject can be conscious of himself without thinking; but it is manifest that no other view is open to one who maintains that the original sin of the intellect is judgment, and its inevitable penalty expulsion from the paradise of faith.

John Watson.
University of Queen's College..