self, let me point out that the only capacities which demand realization, thus forming our ideal, are specific capacities; that, if there is any such thing as capacity in general, it never presents itself to our consciousness, much less imposes an end of action upon us. The capacities of a child, for example, are not simply of a child, not of a man, but of this child, not of any other. So far as they have to do with the ideal to be realized, it is the precise capabilities existing at that exact moment, capabilities as individualized as that place in space and that portion of time which are concerned. Make the capacities ‘infinite,’ or the content of some presupposed self, instead of actually then and there, actually knowable, and they furnish no end to be executed. And if it be objected that the child should be trained to act with reference to some ‘infinite’ capacity, some unlimited and immeasurable power which will keep appearing as he grows older, and that failure to take that into account from the first, means a stunted development for the child, the objection will serve to emphasize the point. If this capacity is anything which may be taken into account, then it is a part of the actual definite situation; it is not infinite in the sense of indefinite, although it may be ‘infinite’ in value–which means, I suppose, that it is the only thing worth specially considering at the time. Suppose, for example, the self which the child is to realize involves some artistic capacity. Let it be said that this end transcends the child’s consciousness, and therefore is not an actually present capacity. None the less, the realization of this artistic self can be made the end only if it is present in some one’s consciousness. The objection means simply that the situation which the parent or the educator sees, the reality upon which he has his eye, is larger than the one which the child sees. It is not a case of contrast between an actuality which is definite, and a presupposed but unknown capacity, but between a smaller and a larger view of the actuality. If the child’s real end is different from that which would immediately suggest itself to him, it is not because some capacity transcending his specific self (belonging to some presupposed ideal
