in time is just the realization of the relations subsisting between it and other monads, each of which as a representative of its own body reflects the universe from its own point of view. They must harmonize, because all the changes in the body of each are relative to the totality of changes of the whole world, and the monad represents the changes of its own body and thus of the whole world.
One of the most interesting sections is that in which the free activity of substances is discussed. The ordinary view entirely fails to apprehend the doctrine of Leibnitz, because it supposes ‘inclination’ to be a purely mechanical impulse. In truth ‘inclination’ is just the desire for a conceived good, attainable by means of a greater or less series of acts, and a will ruled by inclination is therefore free. It is true that Leibnitz rightly rejects the so-called ‘liberty of indifference,’ but in doing so he does not deny but substantiates self-determination.
In his account of the Leibnitzian conception of God, our author finds himself equally at variance with the traditional interpretation, according to which the idea of God is introduced in order to bring the monads into harmony with one another. This is not Leibnitzian. What Leibnitz says is, that while in point of fact substances from their very constitution are in harmony with one another, they might not have been so. Reflection upon the facts of experience proves their harmony, but experience cannot show that they might not have been of a totally different nature. We can only explain ultimately why they are what they are by attributing their nature to the will of God. Before the intellect of God all possible worlds were presented, and he selects that world in which all the parts harmonize. This act of choice, however, is determined by reason. God is pure activity, and his intelligence is therefore entirely free from temporal limits; hence his act of choice is not to be regarded as subsequent to his intuition of the possible worlds: the relation is logical, not temporal. True, we cannot represent to ourselves the inner nature of God’s activity, but we can see that it must be a timeless activity, free from all limitation. And, as the world is an expression of the rational choice of God, we must hold that nature is not a mere mechanical system, but must also be viewed as the realization of ends. Hence we must in interpreting nature make use of the idea of final cause as well as of efficient cause.
There are other interesting points in this work which I have been forced to pass over, as, for instance, the explanation of the principle of continuity; but enough has been said to indicate its stimulating