of mathematics. But this problem can be discussed to better advantage in connection with the correspondence of Kant and Lambert. There is nothing to indicate that Kant received any other important suggestion from Lambert's work. Even at this period (1764), Kant's thought had reached such a point in its development that he could have derived but little from Lambert's attempted reconciliation of the Lockian and Leibnizian theories of knowledge. Even Lambert's exhaustive discussion of being and appearance (Sein and Schein), which reminds one of the Kantian distinction between noumenon and phaenomenon, it is unnecessary to consider. For Kant must inevitably have been forced to such a distinction, rejecting as he did the Wolffian theory of thought and reality.
Turning now to the correspondence of Kant and Lambert,[1] we find that in November, 1765, the then famous mathematician wrote to the Konigsberg decent, calling his attention to the similarity of their views in astronomy and in philosophy, for Kant had already published his Theory of the Heavens and also his dissertation on The Only Possible Proof for the Existence of God. Lambert proposes, moreover, that they plan a joint philosophical undertaking. The object of this is to be the improvement of metaphysics, and above all the perfection of a new method, for this is especially needed, since the method of Wolff, which proceeds in a circle of definitions and assumptions, has already proved its inadequacy.[2] To these overtures Kant immediately replied, accepting Lambert's offer, of which he shows the warmest appreciation. Lambert wrote again a month later, stating as the problem of interest, "whether, and if so how far, knowledge of form leads to knowledge of matter."[3] In philosophy, Lambert explains in some detail, we cannot resort to intuition as in mathematics, as we are here concerned with material, not merely formal truth. But if we wish to make progress in metaphysics, we must go back to the simplest elements in knowledge. Unfortunately Kant did not reply to this
