a man is free when he can resist his inclinations through reason; a man governed by his reason, by moral principles, is free. Why some men are lacking in moral principle, others not, the author does not undertake to explain; he accepts it as an inexplicable fact. And it is wiser to make this confession than to assume with Kant that the good will is a will chosen by a timeless, intelligible character.
Frank Thilly.
Cornell University.
The problem which Dr. McConnell has set before himself in The Duty of Altruism is whether it is "possible to prove to the selfish man that altruism is right and rational." Right he defines in terms of what we should do well to call the idealistic theory, even though, in order to do so, we may have to alter our terminology at one or two other points. The application to conduct of the adjectives right and wrong is due to the presence of an ideal; the right is a form of the good, and the good means that which is adopted as an end by the will. That this position, with proper definitions, is identical with the view that moral judgments have their source in the emotions of approbation and disapprobation, is explicitly recognized. The rational is defined—in accordance with a common, but by no means universal, form of idealism—as being merely that mode of conduct leading to the end that appeals to desire. From these accounts of the fundamental terms Dr. McConnell believes it follows immediately that moral distinctions are absolutely subjective; so that it is sheer nonsense to say to another person, "You ought." For either he is actually pursuing the end in question, so that your "ought" is unnecessary; or else it does not appeal to him, in which case the "ought" is mere nonsense. The attempt to avoid this conclusion by asserting that the interests of the broadest egoism—which the author seems to assume is a universal characteristic of human nature—and of altruism are identical, is declared to be inadmissible, because such identity is in fact not complete.
The conclusion derived from the above definition of right is fortified by a critique of the various theories that claim universal validity for the moral judgment. This critique occupies the greater part of the book. By implication, all egoistic theories, hedonistic or otherwise, are rejected, though they are not subjected to a special examination. Theological theories, the first to be studied, are condemned on grounds familiar to every one and now almost universally accepted. The chapter on metaphysical theories criticises the system of Kant, Schopenhauer's doctrine
