Page:Philosophical Review Volume 21.djvu/157

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No. 2.]
EVOLUTION.
139

clear to us the result to be attained by her behavior, whether that result be a bodily satisfaction or future offspring, or we desire one which will disclose what it is that induces the hen so to behave. We do not desire, or rationally ought not to desire, an answer which will disclose why the hen sits irrespective of the end to be attained by her behavior or of the stimulus which excites her. In other words, unless we are mythologists, we do not expect to be told why in a world like ours it is characteristic of hens to sit. To be sure, we do want to discover what that characteristic behavior is, what stimulates it, what the hen's structure is, how that structure has come about, and what results from her activity, and there our rational interest stops. To suppose that the answers to any one or to all of these questions will give us an explanation of the fact or possibility of sitting hens in a world like ours is totally to misconceive their import. There are hens, they do sit, they thus perpetuate their kind, and they have had a history which is measurably ascertainable; but hens must be given first, if there is to be any investigation of them or any discovery of their evolution. If there were no hens, or never had been any, all our science and all our philosophy would be irrelevant to their consideration. Evolution, that is, discloses and is the history of what exists or what has existed, but it is always with the existent that it begins. To suppose, therefore, that any state of the universe, however remote or distant, has a metaphysical superiority to any other, or a greater right to ontological eulogy, or is possessed of a more potent efficiency, is, to my mind, radically irrational.

The opposite opinion is not unfamiliar. Although it may not be as widely held as formerly, it is still current, clouding our intelligence, depressing our energies, and weakening our responsibilities. We have been frequently told that if we knew completely the state of the cosmos before hens existed, we should then be able to set the date for the first hen that would eventually appear, we should be able to tell, that is, whether there would ever be such things as hens in this world of ours because we should have become cognizant of all the causes of its evolution. Perhaps such a statement cannot be refuted. Every attempted refuta-