This paper is an attempt to outline, in a tentative way, the main features of a conational psychology. It attempts, therefore, first to show that conation is the only mental element. To do this, the author divides experience into two elements, the experiencing act and the thing experienced; the former he calls sensation, perception, etc., and the latter the sensum, perceptum, etc. He holds, however, that psychology is not concerned with the latter, since it is non-mental, though not necessarily physical, in character. This leaves conation of course as the universal form of consciousness, and as the only psychological element. Conation has, however, two fundamental forms, the practical and the speculative; the first of which is characterized by the fact that it attempts to alter the external world, and the second by the fact that, though action is present in principle, it is nevertheless inhibited. All conation, therefore, is volitional in character. But given conation as the only form of consciousness, the problem of psychology is to describe in detail the various forms which this mental process assumes at the different levels of life. It must show, in short, the modifications which consciousness undergoes in sensation, perception, etc. This plan of treatment is then applied in outline and in a wholly tentative manner to such mental processes as sensation, perception, wish, association of ideas, desire, expectation and memory, thinking, judgment, etc. Feeling and external movement, however, are not considered.
A. H. Jones.
Both the traditional and the scientific doctrines of morality are attempts to ground practice in theory, virtue in knowledge. The traditional method of teaching morality is inefficient, because good conduct is not induced by rules derived deductively after the fashion of geometrical formulæ; neither is a metaphysic of morals a successful formulation of moral conduct, for such a metaphysic cannot apply to that moral experience with which it has nothing in common. Similarly, scientific or sociological ethics which treats as social facts those rules, commands, and prohibitions that the traditional ethics treats as metaphysical concepts, lacks efficiency, because in confining itself to the external and social aspects of conduct, it ignores the preeminent moral fact of the internal life of the individual. Moral living is an art, the practice of which springs from personal desires and ideals; and to this art, theory is subsequent and subsidiary, not prior and fundamental. The will cannot be instructed, but must be nourished by inspiration and guided by virtuous example. In short, the doctrine of morality is not a science, but a fine art which determines the value and end of life. The founding of morality upon the intimate experience and ideals of individuals might appear to lead to anarchy in moral conduct; but in morals, as in every other sphere of human activity,
