Page:Philosophical Review Volume 21.djvu/504

 

 

SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS.—Am. J. Ps.=The American Journal of Psychology; Ar. de Ps.=Archives de Psychologie; Ar. f. G. Ph.=Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie; Ar. f. sys. Ph.=Archiv für systematische Philosophie; Br. J. Ps.=The British Journal of Psychology; Int. J. E.=International Journal of Ethics; J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth.=The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods; J. de Psych.=Journal de Psychologie; Psych. Bul.=Psychological Bulletin; Psych. Rev.=Psychological Review; Rev. de Mét.=Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale; Rev. Néo-Sc.=Revue Néo-Scolastique; Rev. Ph.=Revue Philosophique; Rev. de Ph.=Revue de Philosophie; R. d. Fil.=Rivista di Filosofia e Sciense Affini; V. f. w. Ph.=Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie; Z. f. Ph. u. ph. Kr.=Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik; Z. f. Psych.=Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane, I. Abtl. Zeitschrift für Psychologie.—Other titles are self-explanatory.]

 

Morality as Inter-personal. E. W. Hirst. Int. J. E., XXII, 3, pp. 298-321.

This essay is intended to be, first of all, a criticism of the usual view of ethics as being too individualistic; secondly, it is a plea that morality is no form of merely uni-personal activity, but is rather an inter-personal relationship. We can only conceive of a good in some form of desirable conscious life. We find that most moralists have regarded conscious life as belonging to the mere individual, considered in abstraction and isolated from his fellows; and have further increased the artificiality of their treatment of the ethical problem by abstracting some element of conscious life and identifying goodness with the perfection of such element. Even consciousness itself, when it is regarded as that of the individual considered in abstraction, cannot possess ethical quality. Since a self is not active except among other selves, morality, being some attitude of the self as a whole, must be inter-personal. The problem is now to determine the relation between selves which is ethical. Whatever form of activity we decide to be morally valid, must have its psychical antecedents. There is disagreement among psychologists as to the beginnings of sociality. Professor Baldwin finds the beginnings of sympathy in imitation; but it is one thing to feel 'like' others, quite another to feel 'for' others. The latter cannot evolve from the former. Accordingly, many psychologists try to find the origin of ethical love in the maternal instinct. Here, too, we find difficulties in evolving ethical love from a mere instinct. Regarding philanthropy as a form of the maternal instinct, we do not even here get rid of that automatism and narrowness of range aforementioned. But a true 'philanthropy'—that love of man which is ethical—will seek for others a 'good' which one judges highest for oneself. This coherence of selves is life's consummate achievement. The ideal is a 'love of love' rather than the desire for the mere happiness of another. However, there is no meaning in the statement that love alone is good, it is only in its manifestation in various human activities that we prize it. Granted that there are no deeds right in themselves, we may well expect that