But even proceeding on this assumption it would seem necessary somewhere in the course of the argument to dispose of the pragmatists' contention that between pragmatism and the mysticism, voluntarism and intuitionism of previous anti-intellectualisms there is this important difference: these anti-intellectualisms not only retained but were based upon the intellectualistic conception of the intellect, viz., that it is a self-enclosed function, quite independent in its operation of the other functions. For mysticism, voluntarism, etc., are all attempts to escape the difficulties of a segregated intellect by substituting an equally segregated will or feeling or intuition. Pragmatism on the other hand has tried to maintain some kind of organic connection between intelligence and the other functions.
But the author is either unaware of, or ignores all this. Nor does he come to close quarters with the problems which have been acute in the English and American discussion. There is frequent appeal to 'necessity' and 'consistency' without sufficient criticism of these concepts. The laws of number and of pure geometry are regarded as 'necessary laws of the movement of thought.' But applied mathematics, which is the realm within which the scientific pragmatism represented by Poincaré plays its rôle, is experimental and has only a 'limited necessity.'
The most general form of the author's indictment of pragmatism is that it ignores and consequently confuses and confounds the distinction between psychological and logical necessity. Here again no account is taken of the extended discussion of this point which has gone on from the beginning of the movement.
Perhaps some of the neglected issues are reserved for another volume which is to follow. But it is difficult to see how any one who has followed closely the discussions of pragmatism during the last ten years could proceed on assumptions which have been constantly in question in these debates without more recognition, if only in footnotes, of the unsettled status of these presuppositions than is given by M. Berthelot.
Addison W. Moore.
The University of Chicago.
The original book of which the work under consideration is an excellent translation appeared as Vol. I in Reclam's Bücher der Naturwissenschaft. The author holds that "natural philosophy is not only concerned with the question of the mutual connection of all physical relations, but also endeavors to include in the sphere of its study chemical, biological, astronomical, in short, all known phenomena" (p. 1). All scientific investigation needs natural philosophy as a background so that the interconnection and relative value of scientific facts may not be overlooked.
Science begins with the formation of the concept; this is based upon the physiological retention of similar experiences. These concepts, through asso-
