conative and emotional constitution, the entire problem of morality upon the psychological and neurological sides consists in the opening of right afferent and efferent channels to the instincts, the formation of desirable sentiments, and the consequent upbuilding of character. This proper shaping and control of one or more instincts constitutes a virtue. A combination of Aristotle's conception of virtue, slightly modified, with the doctrine of primary instincts is what is meant. Virtue is an ἕξις—not a mere activity, but a habit carefully fixed by deliberate choice under the guidance of reason. It is a mean between excessive strength and deficiency in the instinct, this mean not reckoned quantitatively but in intelligent consideration of personal and social demands. The genesis of virtues is preceded by the formation of habits (and rudimentary sentiments) without self-consciousness and deliberate choice. The subsequent selfconscious recognition of such an habit, and consequent rational modification of the habit in the interests of ethical desirability effect the production of an ἕξις, or virtue.
The habits that thus precede the appearance of ethical virtues are formed under the influence of custom morality, which furnishes a stern social discipline, and develops socially desirable habits of conduct and corresponding mental traits in individuals.[1] The psychology of custom formation concerns us here in only one of its aspects. At a stage when attention is not centered upon mental qualities of the individual, such as his emotions, desires, motives, and character, and the only requirement is that he shall conform to the custom in his external actions, this requirement nevertheless inevitably results in developing within him habits of conduct that attach themselves to his instincts, and so give rise to certain traits of character. Later, when customary morality breaks down in any given field, and reflective thinking appears, the value of the mental traits implied in previous conduct comes to conscious recognition, and the mental traits as then critically modified and self-consciously adopted, become virtues in the strict ethical sense.
- ↑ The psychological influences operative in the formation of customs have been summarized by Professor James H. Tufts in an article entitled "Moral Evolution" in the Harvard Theological Review, April, 1912.
