Page:Philosophical Review Volume 23.djvu/232

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THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW.
[Vol. XXIII.

standard of moral judgment. The line of distinction is drawn between actions which contribute to the satisfaction of all the capacities of the human self and those which serve to gratify only single ones. The former are judged good: the latter are pronounced bad" (p. 214). The application of a criterion so general to questions of specific right and wrong is often obscure and difficult. "This does not lessen the value of Self-realization as the Ideal, however; for, in order to fulfil this office, a conception must ... be universally applicable throughout the entire field of conduct. Hence while in the regulation of daily life we may find that principles, more definite in meaning and limited in range, are usually of greater assistance, still on critical occasions when these principles themselves are called into question such an ideal is indispensable as a final court of appeal. The Ideal may be likened to the polar star which, far removed from the affairs of our planet, gives to the surveyor of the earth's surface his ultimate direction of reference" (p. 215).

Professor Boodin's criticism that Self-realization does not permit us to make distinctions of moral worth, as between the conduct of different individuals, is handled with equal decisiveness and with rather more attention than it deserves. The entire argument of the book is by implication an answer to both these critics. But the author unfolds freely his doctrine of Self-realization as the ultimate criterion of conduct in the two great fields of human value—individual and social interests. There emerge the maxims of Prudence and Idealism, of Altruism and Humanitarianism.

The difficult problem of self-sacrifice Professor Wright seeks to solve by conceiving of moral development as a progressive self-organization. He illustrates it by the evolution of an organism, in which parts developed independently are subordinated to the interest of the comprehensive unity. In the moral life, self-mastery causes real suffering, but seeks the individual's total interest; and on a larger scale, self-sacrifice entails real loss to the individual, but promotes the welfare of society. Professor Baillie's exposition of self-sacrifice in the Hibbert Journal for January is more illuminating. Further, Self-realization furnishes the strongest motives to right conduct. The egoistic, altruistic and religious motives, inadequate singly, are organically united in the motive of Self-realization, which expresses itself as self-respect, philanthropy and reverence. A life thus unified and harmonized brings happiness.

Part IV, on "The Life of Self-realization," hazards, with the courage that it praises, a classification of the virtues. Professor Wright's achievement here is a gauntlet to the apathetic and the skeptical.