contains many innovations which, though giving evidence (to apply Plato's words) ψυχῆς στοχαστικῆς καὶ ἀνδρείας, fail to stand the test of the critical reader; but it is certainly provocative of thought, and, since such books are rare, it is destined to yield results which no man can forecast. There is not a dull page in the volume, and there are few which will not be found to have contributed something of value to the discussion.
One thing more ought perhaps to be said. The impression left by the book on the mind of one who is acquainted with the literature of the subject is not altogether pleasant because of the way in which credit is given for suggestions derived from others. Consistency in this regard is perhaps a counsel of perfection more easily given than observed; but where a few creditors are remembered and others are ignored it is to be expected that the latter will be more ready to forgive than to commend the procedure. At various points the writer felt sure that his monographs and scattered essays had given the suggestion which Professor Burnet embodied in his exposition, though he is credited with nothing but controversy (p. 27, note). Controversy is an idle thing, and no one is great enough to deserve to be made the subject of it. If there be nothing but controversy in an article or a book, it hardly merits the honor of being mentioned by a serious scholar.
Wesleyan University.
Clarity of conception, logical symmetry in divisions, absolute certainty of attitude mark the thought of Croce. Distinction of style and historical background, frequent allusions to general as well as technical literature, make a worthy vehicle for the thought. There is not a query, a 'probably' or a 'perhaps,' or an 'I think.' Instead there is a calm assurance which rests its case upon its positive statement or upon the inconsistencies of opposed doctrines. In its opposition to eudaemonism and utilitarianism it sides with Kant, "after whom no serious philosopher can be anything but a Kantian in Ethic" (p. 401). In its insistence upon a concrete universal as the object of the ethical volition, as well as in occasional employment of the dialectic process, it is Hegelian. In its definition of the universal as "perpetual development, creation, progress," it is in accord with the pragmatism which it denounces.
