the next forward step in ethics could be taken. The reason for this was that the main line of ethical thought did not pass through Locke. Berkeley's intuition was not at fault in believing that the main metaphysical advance lay through Locke; and he was enabled to do his own good work by putting his finger unerringly on the spot from which that advance might best begin. His initial mistake in ethics lay in thinking that progress might be made in that branch of philosophy also by observing and correcting Locke's suggestions towards a mathematical treatment of ethics. But Berkeley soon perceived that the path marked out by Locke led into a cul-de-sac; and he therefore abandoned the attempt to construct a mathematical system of ethics. In his later ethical work he makes suggestions which do place him right in the center of the line of ethical advance in England. That line led through Hume to Utilitarianism. Berkeley believes, as we have seen, that the summum bonum is not private pleasure but the happiness and general good of all. And he draws a sharp distinction between different kinds of pleasure. So far as we can tell from Berkeley's scattered remarks, he did not appreciate the problems which Utilitarianism has to face. As it is, it is an anachronism to call him, as Professor Campbell Eraser does, a theological Utilitarian. But he was moving in that direction, and if he had given to the question the thought necessary to produce a systematic work, he might have been the first Utilitarian.
| G. A. Johnston. |
| Glasgow University. |
