V.
It remains true that the objects toward which a man is ultimately moving cannot be discovered by external observation. For in the case of just these objects, which most define the man, the 'recession of the stimulus' has proceeded to infinity; and further, the 'stimulus'—these objects themselves—has become intangible in nature. Hence we cannot identify a man's major purposes in the manner suggested by Holt, that of exhibiting the objects (though we might attempt a metaphysical definition of them); nor can we discover them by Freud's method of uncovering repressed wishes. The best instrument which has so far been devised for discovering what these major wishes are is, I believe, an ancient one, the Platonic logic of the affections. It is the peculiar merit of the Socratic dialectic, as shaped by Plato, that it reveals precisely that part of the subconscious self (if we wish to describe in these terms that unanalyzed part of the self which Socrates, as midwife, undertook to deliver) which as censor of the individual is also the common sense, and so the common censor, of mankind.[1]
The working part of the dialectic of Plato might be roughly described as a comparison of an experimental definition of a term (in connotation) with accepted cases of its denotation. If courage be defined as daring; and it is admitted that one who
- ↑ One of the most vigorous and inspiriting aspects of Holt's book is its recognition of points of contact with Platonic psychology and ethics. The main point of this agreement is in the doctrine that only the good man is free, and only the wise can be good. Holt's method of reaching this goal of freedom, by discrimination and synthesis, differs from the dialectic of Plato, as I shall try to make clear, precisely in that part of the subconscious which it is destined to set free. It is needless to point out that the freedom which Plato had in mind was quite consistent with a somewhat ascetic, or repressive, attitude toward the body. The Symposium presents us with perhaps the first instance of a conscious philosophy of sublimation, by finding in universal terms an equivalent for the specific forms of wish. If Plato appears in any modern dress, it must be as a democratized Plato, so far as the rank of our various affections is concerned. This modern contribution to Plato's thought, the release of the human spirit from distrust of its 'lower nature,' is perfectly carried out in Holt's theory. But the question remaining unanswered is, How shall we distinguish among our wishes those which identify ourselves, and so have especial right to be regarded as major or ruling wishes? What is it which, on the whole, we want to do? In answering this question Plato's method, or a modified form of it, is still, I hold, our best recourse.
