any given instant move any individual mind in volition."[1] It may be formally more complete, but it is not therefore a final test of the individual's importance, for the 'explicit ideas which move the individual mind to volition' may represent precisely the indispensable reconstruction of the social institutions them- selves. The individual gets far less than justice, while the system gets far more; for the social system, like system generally in the idealist philosophy, is conceived as self-creating, self-operating, and self-developing. A characteristic sentence from Professor Bosanquet will illustrate this view: "The legislator is merely one of the organs of the social spirit itself, as it carries out its self-criticism and self-interpretation."[2]
It is to be noted, however, that with characteristic British caution, Professor Bosanquet is hardly willing to accept what would appear to be the practical implications of this view. Indeed, he places a rather narrow limit upon the justifiable action of a state upon its citizens, even while he denies that this has anything to do with a distinction between society and individuals in the realization of a good life.[3] The good life, he argues, can be realized only in consciousness and consciousness is on one side, at least, particular and individual. But ultimately the state has no instrument of action except force, though not every action of the state is actually carried out by means of force, and force cannot insure that an action shall proceed from motives which permit it to become an element of the best life. "An action performed ... under compulsion is not a true part of the will."[4] The means of action which the state has at its disposal is not therefore in pari materia with the end which it seeks. Hence Professor Bosanquet deduces the conclusion that "what it [the state] can effect is to remove obstacles, to destroy conditions hostile to the realization of the end."[5] The action of the state is negative rather than positive; it can only 'hinder hind-
