place in some social environment, as definite and indefeasible as the actual place of his body in relation to the earth's surface. It is probably true that there never has been, whether in a lunatic asylum or elsewhere, a real live solipsist; or one who seriously equates the universe with his personal consciousness; but certain forms of idealism, not to say insanity, lay an undue stress upon ego-subjectivity, or the supposed absoluteness of personality, no matter whether personal sensations and emotions, or personal ideas and judgments, are regarded as the more important elements. It is, of course, certain that no individual can ever literally get away from his own consciousness, any more than he can, to use a homely phrase, jump out of his own skin. It is through conscious sensations of touch, which appear to be located in the skin, as well as through consciously seeing the surface of his own hands, etc., that he becomes aware of having a skin and remaining in it. But when such terms as 'have,' 'skin,' and 'remain' are presented to his consciousness, he knows that neither the terms nor their applications to the facts or things signified are his own inventions. He has learnt to apply them in his intercourse with other persons, and intercourse or books have been no less necessary to teach him the applications of any psychological terms by which he may describe his own states and modes of consciousness. Thus from the logical or contemplative standpoint it is as impossible for him to get away from socially created meanings, as it is always impossible for him to get away from personal experience.[1]
The reality of objective things is partially vouched for by the intuitive redintegration of personal sensations of sight and touch, but it is still more potently vouched for by the fact that self and others can readily agree to call the same objects and types and the same objective processes, qualities, and relations by the same names. This agreement is arrived at when a given object or an instance of a given type or mode can be simultaneously observed by two or more persons thrown together at the same time in the same place, one of whom applies to the
- ↑ Here we must understand that personal experience covers personal thinking, though it does not cover objective things about which we think.
