Page:Philosophical Review Volume 26.djvu/190

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PHILOSOPHY AS HANDMAID OF SOCIETY.

IDEALS and facts and their collision: This would seem to be in brief the story of human progress. In particular the ideal of disinterested inquiry has engaged the philosopher even while constantly baffled by the non-rational factors. In the several eras this conflict has appeared in various forms, and it still continues.

It is the purpose of these pages to seek light on this problem by reference to the rationale of man as a social organism, and the conclusion may be stated at once: That wholly disinterested inquiry must remain an ideal only, since however free it may become it is bound ultimately to regard the welfare of society as a basic condition of all human activity, including the search for truth itself.

The ideal of pure reason as sole guide has stimulated and inspired the philosopher in all ages. Indeed, as seeker for truth he has exhibited a subtle pride in pursuing his search disinterested, unprejudiced and unchecked by all factors extraneous to pure truth as such. He has resolved to "follow the argument wherever it leads"; and, like Aristotle, he has felt impelled to set his love of truth above his love of Plato. By virtue of this noble ideal he has kept alive the spirit of progress and enlightenment, whose history may be viewed very properly as man's effort to seek truth with reason as sole determinant.

This zealous devotion to impartial research has received classic formulation in the well known essay by Clifford,[1] whose sentences issue like veritable fulminations. Thus, the duty of questioning all that we believe is declared to be a universal one; it is insisted that the authority of tradition imposes on us the responsibility of daily testing; we may never allow comfort or well-being to interfere with evidence in any way; only reasonable grounds may justify the acceptance of belief; and the warning is given, with the fervor of religious enthusiam, to guard our beliefs

  1. "The Ethics of Belief," in Lectures and Essays, 2d ed., 1886, pp. 339-363.