And that is to say, that all search for truth must carry with it regard for morality or social welfare.[1]
We may now develop briefly the second point mentioned at the outset, namely, the struggle between the naturally monistic tendency of reason as such and the pluralistic direction demanded by facts and values.
All relations of part to whole imply a system of subordination, with ultimate integration by reference to a single element. This is expressed in the law of parsimony or economy of thought. We think most successfully by systematizing with reference always to fewer than to more; two rather than three, and one rather than two. Hence the demands of pure reason as such impel us to some ultimate unit in the process of systematic thinking; and if this impulse of reason is followed we may not stop short of monism as distinguished from pluralism. Now this constructive action of reason is at the root of the process of institutional organization; allied therewith at the outset it is employed more and more as construction advances. Thus reason acts from the start as the handmaid of society, which in turn enables and fosters its operation. But in time the performance of reason develops beyond the sphere of such immediate service and seeks to create a realm of its own with unchecked freedom. Here conscious conflict becomes imminent; for the natural tendency of reason toward complete organization then issues as distinctly monistic. The result is found to be both artificial and menacing; the former because of the stubborn resistance of
- ↑ Morality in the broadest sense is meant, of course; distinctions being waived in the interests of conciseness. While true moral conduct may be characterized by spontaneity in contrast with compulsion, this brief formulation of our theme is really not question-begging. For the 'higher morality,' at whatever elevation it may be, is set in an integral continuum and is quite unthinkable divorced from its antecedent stages. Thus the morality of sympathy and love may become crystallized in the etiquette of courtesy, which as second nature hardly loses its moral value. Moreover, while the works of supererogation are in the vanguard of all moral endeavor, still this does not rob all other endeavor of morality. Distinctions are of prime importance in marking out any field for study, to be sure; but the complexity of human conduct should warn us of the danger of artificiality in such distinctions. It is sufficient for our purpose to observe that regard for consequences has constituted the mark of morality for a large group of moralists, while concern for 'morality' has served and does serve as occasion for pause in developing the strict logic of any theory or system.
