ological theories of the origin and nature of religion advanced by M. Émile Durkheim, M. Lévy-Bruhl, and their collaborators in L'Année Sociologique which are styled by the author "group theories of religion," and to which he opposes "the religion of the individual."
Mr. Webb effectively shows the doubtfulness of the existence of "collective representations" supposed by this school to subsist in the collective mentality of groups as wholes, and to be collectively passed down from one generation to another, without having come into existence in the first place upon the initiative of an individual mind. Even if the doctrine be true (and Mr. Webb apparently himself accepts it in less extreme form, cf. p. 19), it does not follow, as some of the writers of the school appear to affirm, that collective representations are necessarily false. M. Lévy-Bruhl's doctrine that primitive man has a "pre-logical mentality" totally different from ours, which is devoid of the law of contradiction, and instead is governed by the "law of participation," comes in for keen criticism upon the part of our author. M. Levy-Bruhl's illustrations do not show that the savage mind never thinks in terms of the law of contradiction, if this law is rightly understood; moreover, civilized man also sometimes thinks in a manner analogous to 'participation.' That there really is a difference in degree here, however, Mr. Webb seems willing to admit. He also shows that this school has overstated its doctrine of the social origin of the categories. The fact, for instance, that savages have parcelled out universal space along the principles of division of their camps does not show that they owe their capacity to think spatially to their camp divisions, but merely that the latter suggested a mode of classification for which man possessed a capacity in the first place.
Effective as are Mr. Webb's criticisms of the more radical doctrines of this school, he fails to appreciate their real contributions. That social life has had a tremendous influence in shaping primitive thought, that ideas are handed down from one generation to another through tradition without being subjected to individual examination and criticism, that social life has done much to give the categories their content, that the categories of primitive man, though not totally different from our own, are far more confused and less effective tools for thought and action and that this is due in part to their collective character: these are only a few of the many profound truths regarding the general evolution of human consciousness, including the religious consciousness, that we owe to this school. Mr. Webb fails to see this because he writes less from the standpoint of a philosopher or scientist than from that of an apologist for his own particular form of Christian theology. He views the entire work of this school with suspicion and distrust because its adherents (with the exception, however, of M. Durkheim himself, and one or two partial disciples in England) appear to him to think that religion is a savage survival bound to disappear with the advance of civilization and enlightenment. So he feels it necessary to oppose to them "the religion of the individual." This last consists chiefly of the rather trite truism that religion is a matter of personal experience that every man has to have for himself. The fact that M. Durk-
