perience. But in the field of intelligent experience he held that thought played a subordinate rôle, sensation, perception, memory, feeling, and volition all being parts of intelligent experience. He held that thought works upon an alien material, sense, and is guided by feeling. Thought is a discursive faculty, occupied with the universal and the abstract; its function is purely formal. For Bradley, reality, the Absolute, is a whole beyond the act of judgment and presenting itself as an Other which thought cannot attain. Bosanquet, on the other hand, postulates the world as a rational system. Judgment functions as a progressive articulation within the postulated system. Bosanquet thus avoids Bradley's scepticism. On the question of the criterior of truth, Lotze believed in self-evident truths: the criterion was an immediate feeling of self-evidence. For Bradley, truth is impossible, for in attaining it we pass beyond relational thought to a higher level. For Bosanquet, the criterion of truth is system. The ultimate systematic character of the world, he assumes: in itself it is neither self-evident, nor capable of proof. Lotze sets up a complete dualism between thought and sense, but seemed to hold to a chance coincidence between the two. In Bradley, the dualism persists, but with a sceptical result. In Bosanquet the problem is more satisfactorily solved by the postulate of rationality. But even in him traces of dualism persist: thus he seems to attribute superior reality to what is given by sense, to the 'this' of perception. Objectivity is adequately denned in terms of the compulsion reality exercises upon thought.
W. Curtis Swabey.
Among the views which regard the practical judgment as constitutive of values, two classes may be distinguished, the humanistic, which construes judgment in a psychological sense, and the absolutistic, which construes it in a logical sense. Dewey may be taken as a representative of the former school. He presents the crux of the matter when he says, "To judge value is to engage in instituting a determinate value where none is given." In criticism of Dewey's position it is important to keep the following consideration in mind: "It is impossible to interpret any judgment merely from its verbal record." The identity of a judgment depends on what it virtually appeals to for its disproof or verification. Every judgment has objective reference of two sorts. In the first place it is about something whose reality is not in question. Secondly, there is something judged. The former may be termed the 'object' of the judgment, and regarded as a constituent of both alternative facts. What is judged about anything we may term the 'objective' of the judgment; it is a hypothetical fact, that toward which my motor set is directed. Dewey's failure to state what constitutes the identity of a judgment makes criticism of his view difficult, but upon examination it seems he can offer no case of a value's being constituted by a judgment of it. To take the example of the situation in which one suffers from ill-health: my judging that I dislike my
