Page:Philosophical Review Volume 29.djvu/531

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No. 6.]
PRINCIPLES IN ETHICS.
517

of work in particular carries with it our settled sense of approval so that we pronounce it really and permanently, and not just 'apparently,' good? Are there any general principles here to be discovered on scrutiny which will guide us in our actual quest, or are we left wholly to chance and the rule of thumb?

Now if an ethical principle is a statement about what it is necessary to do in order to be able to lead a satisfying life, it is clear that we shall discover such principles, not in the realm of 'self-evident truths,' but by looking to the facts of experience, and trying to find out what these actually have to say about the possibilities of successful living. The most natural way to classify principles would therefore be in terms of the kind of fact to which we are appealing. And of relevant facts there are three general sorts. First, there are the purely formal conditions which success involves—the abstract methods, that is, that a human being has to follow if he is to get a chance at concrete satisfaction. Second, there are the external conditions he is bound to take into account, since life involves not only desire and interest, but the surroundings under which interests have to get their fulfillment. And, third, there are the inner conditions in terms of the concrete potentialities of man's nature, which set the lines along which satisfaction is possible.

The first or formal principles are of two general sorts, both so obvious as to need no extended discussion. It is evident to begin with that, considering the sort of being man is, a successful life must be a rational life. It must not, that is, be merely impulsive and haphazard, but must submit impulse to rational reflection, and act only after an impartial scrutiny alike of the outer facts, and of the relative value of aims and ideals such as comes from deliberate self-knowledge. It is well to note once more that the maxim, 'Be rational,' does not of itself tell us in the least what is rational; as a principle it is purely formal, and no one but the abstract thinker, concerned less with life itself than with its scientific technique, would be likely to suppose that it covers our ethical needs. But as a formal precondition to any such discovery of the best life, it is quite indispensable.

As the first formal principle, or set of principles, attaches to