an equal element in the universe, whereas H. treats it merely as a stage in the Philosophy of Nature.
We must conclude, then, that the Dialectic is not a process in time and that the Absolute Idea must be eternally realized. But this seems a reductio ad absurdum, and incompatible with the facts. For the universe is certainly not completely rational for us, and even if we believe in the Absolute Idea, we cannot see how it is manifested in a thunderstorm. And if the universe does not appear to us to be perfect, it cannot be so really. For if we are right in so thinking, then the universe is not perfect. If we are wrong, then we are not perfect. And we are part of the world. Thus in one way or other the view that the world is imperfect seems to prove its truth.
Can we then conclude that H.'s philosophy must be abandoned? The difficulty is one which must arise in any system of complete idealism. H. would no doubt explain it by saying that the false can be real—that a real thought may be a defective symbol of the reality it professes to represent. And if it can be real, why can it not be rational? This, indeed, is often found to be the case, when we give a psychological explanation of an erroneous course of thought. Nevertheless the rationality H. requires is more complete than this. It requires the validity also of the idea of final cause. But a delusion is a thought which fails of its purpose. And so the delusion to which H. reduces all imperfection will prevent its being a faithful symbol of the rationality of the world, and will therefore destroy the rationality itself.
F. C. S. S.
Epistemology cuts itself off from the reality either of the ideas or the objects to which they refer, and deals with the mere meaning of ideas. Seth holds, first, that the problem of Epistemology is to explain the transition in knowledge from conscious states to a reality beyond; second, that this problem must be solved before we can attempt to determine whether there is reality and what is its nature. "Subjective states are the data." Seth confuses two questions. 1. Can we know any reality? 2. Can we know any reality besides subjective states? The first question is unanswerable, Epistemology must assume some sort of reality. If it do this, its question is not the objective validity of knowledge, but the relation of one part of reality (i.e., its own data) to another, i.e., an ontological question. Episte-
