Page:Philosophical Review Volume 3.djvu/169

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No. 2.]
ARGUMENT OF SAINT THOMAS.
153

cause only or many causes. Take away the cause, and the effect is also removed: therefore, if there were not a first cause, there would be neither a last nor an intermediate cause. Now, should we extend the series of efficient causes to infinity, we would have no first cause, and consequently neither a last nor an intermediate cause. But this is contrary to fact. It is, therefore, necessary to posit a first efficient cause, and this we call God."—The principle of causality on which St. Thomas builds this reasoning, is analytical, being evident from the mere consideration of the terms. For an effect is that which depends on another for its existence and is therefore produced (Sum. th., I, q. 33, a. 1). That on which it depends is its. cause (Sum. th., I, q. 104, a. 1). The dependence of effect on cause, not mere sequence, as Mill would have it, is unquestionable. For the effect must be produced either by itself, by nothing, or by something distinct from itself. But it cannot give itself existence, since as acting it would exist, and as receiving existence it would be non-existent. It cannot owe its existence to nothing. Nemo dat quod non habet. Therefore, it must have and hold its existence from something else, and this is its cause. Moreover, if this be its total cause, all its perfections must be referred to the same source. Now, every series of produced efficient causes dependent one on another, necessarily demands an unproduced being as its efficient cause. Were we even to grant the possibility of an infinite series of such causes, as they are all essentially dependent, they all essentially postulate a first unproduced cause. If there be no first cause, there can be no second cause, and consequently the whole series of produced causes must disappear. If this series is actually existing, it has a first term and a last term and, therefore, can be numbered. This, with the reasons given by Aristotle (Met., XII) for the finiteness of number, is a sufficient refutation of the over-hasty statement of Ueberweg (History of Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 447) that "the finiteness of the number of terms, which was to be proved is here presupposed by St. Thomas." He seems to forget that the Summa theologica demands a previous acquaintance with