the cooperation of reason and sensibility. Thought extends further, but is empty of content. It is an unkantian assertion that, if the existence of things-in-themselves is otherwise assumed, that is, by practical philosophy, the categories are applicable to them: though it is true that this application is regarded as leading only to indefinite thought, not to any true knowledge.)
839) Scupin: Etwas zur Erläuterung der Kritischen Erörterung von der Freiheit in der Kritik. Seite 570. In the N. Ph. Mg. I, 4, pp. 496-512. (Simple reproduction of the section which begins with page 570 of the R. Vb. It altogether shares the obscurity, indefiniteness and ambiguity of the Kantian concepts and doctrines in question.)
8390) Skizze einer Geschichte der Moral. Cf. no. 734c.
840-878, Snell, Chr. Wlh.
840) Snell, Chr. Wlh.: Die Sittlichkeit in Verbindung mit der Glückseligkeit einzelner Menschen und ganzer Staaten, aus zwo gekrönten Preisschriften zusammengezogen, und mit beständiger Rucksicht auf die Kantische Moralphilosophie ganz neu bearbeitet. 8vo. Frankfurt a. M. Gebhard & Körber. pp. 532. (What has been already said, under no. 734e, of Fr. W. D. Snell, holds in still greater degree of his brother, Chr. Wlh. Snell. In no. 840, with its three successors which were devoted more to abstract ethics, Von dem Empirismus und Purismus in der Moralphilosophie, Von der Freiheit, Von den Erkenntnissgründen der Religion, Snell starts out from Kant's principles with regard to the relation of morality to happiness. Kant requires nothing superhuman. One may strive after happiness, the purest source of which is found in moral actions: only one must on every occasion ask oneself the question, whether means and end are also moral.)
840a) (Snell, Chr. Wlh.:) Ueber Determinismus und moralische Freiheit. Cf. no. 661.
841) Snell, Chr. Wlh.: Beleuchtung einiger der vornehmsten Einwürfe gegen den moralischen Erkenntnissgrund der Religion. In the N. Ph. Mg. 1790. II, 1, 2, pp. 116-204. (Ineffectual attempt to repel the attacks of Flatt [no. 451]. Snell admits that the moral proofs are not convincingly strict demonstrations, but only conclusions for the general understanding of mankind, which pays no heed to the results of the more penetrating investigation into the transcendent non-validity of the categories.)
842) Snell, Chr. Wlh.: Ueber den Egriff von dem Guten überhaupt und von dem höchsten Gute insbesondere. In the N. Ph. Mg. 1791. II, 4, pp. 466-495. (Determination of concepts: good, evil, maxims of policy, moral laws, highest good, perfect good, etc.)
843) Snell, Chr. Wlh.: Versuch für Beantwortung der Frage: Ob die transscendentale Freyheit mit der Abhängigkeit der menschlichen Seele
