propositions for its defence I take to be the following. There are given, to the individual consciousness, different contents,—say: different sensational contents. These contents are given in relation; in the relation of dissimilarity, and in other relations. Psychologically, the individual (1) experiences the differents as different, lives them differently, as 'red' and 'blue,' without recognizing that they are 'differently related'; and (2) associates with them different names, the particular terms 'red' and 'blue.' That is all. Logically, also, two things may occur. (a) A judgment as to the contents is formulated. The psychological correlate of this consists in the two processes, of perception and association, just mentioned. (b) After this has happened, there may take place a logical abstraction of the relation of dissimilarity, the concrete differents themselves (originally and only given in that relation) being disregarded. The psychological correlate of this abstraction (3) consists in some form of apperceptive activity;[1] the abstract relation itself is a logical construction. But now may come a fourth psychological step. (4) The 'relation' logically obtained may be ideated; just as other abstractions may be ideated. The idea of it will be partly pictorial[2] (of the contents as bound or chained together, or as relegated to different departments of space, or what not); partly it will consist in the representation of the word 'relation' (auditory, visual, motor). It is always and invariably a 'content' idea.[3]
I will endeavor to analyze Dr. Lehmann's and Professor James' instances. The former writer finds three classes of (technical) feelings of relation. There are (1) feelings arising from the temporal and intensive relations of ideas; (2) those arising from the relations of ideas which are similar, but refer to different objects; and (3) those arising from the relation of ideas referring to the same object.—(1) As regards the first category, 'attributes' or 'properties' might be written for 'relations.' Surprise, alarm, terror and desire are certainly content-feelings; the content to which the affection attaches being either presentative or representative. (2) The second heading includes all the contrast-feelings. These again are surely content-feelings; witness the quoted instances,—astonishment, speechless amazement, interest of novelty, unpleasantness of tedium.
- ↑ The word 'apperceptive' may prove a stumbling block. What I conceive the particular process to be is, practically, described by Professor sully: Human Mind, I, pp. 391, 392, 417.
- ↑ This statement I have verified by enquiry among my friends. The crudity of the representation is often very suprising.
- ↑ Dr. Schrader denies the possibility of ideation of the conscious relation.
